“Mazaa nai aa raha hai, yaar.”
That blunt line from Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh in February 2025, directed at officials of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), summed up the Indian Air Force’s growing impatience. Speaking at Aero India 2025, the IAF chief publicly called out HAL over repeated delays in the delivery of the indigenous Tejas Mk1A fighter jet.
The remark quickly went viral, not just for its unusual candour but for what it revealed — a problem that has long been discussed quietly within defence circles: the steady shrinking of the Air Force’s fighter fleet.
Air Chief Marshal Singh later tried to soften the blow, describing the comment as a “friendly chat” meant to prick HAL’s conscience. But the frustration was unmistakable. Nearly four years after placing an order for 83 Tejas Mk1A jets in 2021, the IAF has not received a single aircraft.
That frustration has deep roots. The Indian Air Force today is operating its smallest fighter fleet since 1962. With around 30 active squadrons — against a sanctioned strength of 42 — the service is well below what it considers necessary to handle a two-front challenge from China and Pakistan. Each squadron typically fields 18–20 aircraft.
This is why the Air Force will be watching French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to India next month very closely. Hopes are riding on a meeting between Macron and Prime Minister Narendra Modi clearing a long-pending deal to acquire 114 additional Rafale fighter jets.
According to reports, the deal is in its final stages of approval. If cleared, it would mark the culmination of a nearly two-decade-long quest by the IAF to induct a modern multi-role fighter.
It started after Kargil
As defence analyst Sandeep Unnithan explains in the latest episode of In Our Defence, the story goes back to the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil conflict. At the time, the IAF had close to 40 fighter squadrons, many of them made up of MiG-21s. While the aircraft proved their worth, the Air Force knew the ageing Soviet-era jets were nearing the end of their operational lives.
The indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme was still years away from fruition. The solution, the Air Force felt, was a stop-gap purchase — and the Mirage 2000, which had performed impressively during Kargil, seemed the obvious choice. Its precision strikes using laser-guided bombs on Tiger Hill had left a deep impression.
The IAF projected a requirement for 126 Mirage 2000-5 aircraft, the latest variant available then. To ease bureaucratic hurdles, the proposal was framed as an order for “additional” Mirages rather than the induction of a new aircraft type.
That plan, however, was shelved in 2004 after a change in government. The UPA administration was reluctant to commit to such a large single-vendor deal without exploring other options. The Mirage proposal was dropped, and a global contest was launched instead.
The ‘mother of all deals’
Thus was born the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition, soon dubbed the “mother of all defence deals”. Six aircraft entered the fray: the US offered the F-16 and F/A-18, Russia pitched the MiG-35, Sweden brought the Gripen, a European consortium fielded the Eurofighter Typhoon, and France put forward the Rafale.
The Mirage was no longer an option — its production line had been shut down. France reportedly even offered to sell the entire Mirage manufacturing line to India, but New Delhi chose to press ahead with the MMRCA process instead — a decision that, in hindsight, may have worsened today’s squadron crunch.
What followed was a long and exhaustive evaluation process beginning around 2007, with the IAF testing aircraft across different terrains and climates. By the end, the Rafale and the Eurofighter emerged as the finalists. Financial bids eventually tipped the scales in favour of the Rafale, which scored better on lifecycle costs, technical capability, and strategic considerations.
When costs spiralled
Then came what Unnithan describes as “sticker shock”.
Initially pegged at around $10 billion, the cost of acquiring 126 fighters ballooned to nearly $20 billion. At the time, India’s entire defence budget hovered around $35–40 billion.
“You went in to buy a Swift Dzire and came out with an SUV,” Unnithan quips, referring to how a relatively straightforward Mirage purchase evolved into a complex deal involving technology transfer and local manufacturing. Simply put, the money wasn’t there.
There were structural issues too. The plan required 18 jets to be bought off-the-shelf, with the remaining aircraft to be manufactured in India by HAL. The government wanted Dassault to certify the quality of HAL-built jets — a responsibility the French firm refused to accept.
The deal stalled.
The 36-jet compromise
After the NDA government came to power in 2014, the IAF once again pushed for the 126-jet project. But the new government was wary of committing to such an expensive foreign purchase and preferred to prioritise the indigenous Tejas programme, which was beginning to stabilise.
By 2016, the government scrapped the original tender and opted for an emergency off-the-shelf purchase. The Air Force said it needed at least 72 jets; the number was negotiated down to 36 — enough for two squadrons.
The idea was to deploy one squadron in the east and one in the west, while creating infrastructure that could support more Rafales later.
Politics steps in
The plan to buy more Rafales never materialised. The 2019 general election campaign saw the Rafale deal become a political flashpoint, with allegations of corruption dominating the Opposition’s narrative. While the controversy did not dent the NDA’s electoral fortunes, it effectively froze any appetite within the government to revisit Rafale purchases for some time.
Meanwhile, reality caught up. MiG-21s continued to retire, and Tejas inductions failed to keep pace. In September last year, the IAF retired its final MiG-21 squadron, leaving the service with roughly 30 fighter squadrons — its lowest strength since the early 1960s.
MRFA: now or never
Today, the MMRCA has been reborn as the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) programme. Reports suggest the proposal on the table involves 114 Rafale jets at an estimated cost of Rs 3.25 lakh crore — nearly half of India’s defence budget for 2025.
The package is said to include 18 aircraft built in France, with the rest manufactured at a production line in Nagpur. It may also involve upgrades to the IAF’s existing Rafales, including integration of Indian weapons — a limitation that reportedly kept them out of the final Operation Sindoor strikes in May 2025.
Clarity is expected next month, when Prime Minister Modi and President Macron meet.
For the Indian Air Force, as Unnithan puts it, this is “now or never”. With China projected to field over a thousand fifth-generation fighters by the end of the decade — and the Rafale still a 4.5-generation aircraft — the MRFA deal is no longer just about capability.
It is about relevance. About ensuring the IAF stays, to borrow a line often quoted in strategic circles, at the table — and not on the menu.